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PUBLIC RECORDS IN PRIVATE DEVICES: HOW 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 PRIVACY 
RIGHTS CREATE A DILEMMA FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Philip Paine 
Abstract: The Washington Public Records Act (PRA or “the Act”) is a wide-ranging law 
that heavily weighs in favor of public disclosure of government processes. Initially enacted 
as a citizen initiative in 1972, the Act has many beneficial uses. For example, it provides 
insight into a local government’s decision-making process and ensures that citizens have 
access to their own government. However, the PRA’s potential to be used to invade personal 
privacy raises significant constitutional concerns. When an employee in possession of a 
public record invokes the protection of article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution, which protects an individual’s right to privacy, and refuses to consent to, for 
example, inspection of the employee’s personal computer, the agency’s obligation to produce 
the record should be at an end. This Comment argues that neither an agency nor a court may 
compel production of a public employee’s private electronic device for inspection under the 
PRA because employee privacy interests in the device are protected under article I, section 7 
of the Washington State Constitution. The PRA does not provide the necessary “authority of 
law” to justify such an invasion. While this constitutional protection may, in certain 
situations, frustrate the efforts of requestors to access the workings of their government 
agencies, it also provides the public employees of Washington some measure of comfort that 
their private affairs are entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as their fellow 
citizens. Ultimately, the legislature should amend the PRA to clarify the obligations of 
agencies and to strike an appropriate balance between employee privacy and governmental 
transparency. 
INTRODUCTION 
As state and local governments complete their move into the digital 
age, important questions concerning the intersection of the Washington 
Public Records Act (PRA or “the Act”),1 privacy, and personal 
electronic devices remain unresolved. Recent lawsuits illustrate a 
growing tension between the PRA and Washington’s constitutional right 
to privacy.2 As courts struggle to define the PRA’s mandates in an era of 
electronic records and mobile devices, the resulting decisions have the 
potential to create a considerable dilemma for state and local 
government. Under current PRA case law, a local government or state 
1. Washington Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.56 (2014). 
2. E.g., O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 141–45, 240 P.3d 1149, 1151–53 (2010); 
Nissen v. Pierce Cnty., 183 Wash. App. 581, 581–82, 333 P.3d 577, 581–82 (2014). 
545 
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agency could face a situation where it has a duty to produce public 
records it does not possess and cannot constitutionally obtain.3 The 
problem is that while agencies have a duty to produce public records, the 
PRA does not provide the necessary tools, such as a warrant provision, 
that would allow an agency to acquire records protected by article I, 
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.4 While this Comment 
focuses on the dilemma as it relates to public records contained in a 
private computer or email account, an analogous situation arises where a 
public employee sequesters records in his or her home. To illustrate the 
general problem, consider the following hypothetical: 
A public employee of a Washington city decides to take his city 
laptop computer home with him. The next day, the city receives a public 
records request demanding documents contained on the employee’s city 
computer. The employee claims he has no idea where the computer has 
gone, but city officials are reasonably certain that the computer is in the 
employee’s home. The employee insists the computer is not at his home 
and that the city may not search his home to look for it. Can the city, 
solely on the basis of PRA, inspect the employee’s home in order to 
recover and produce responsive public records? 
The answer to this question should be a definitive no. A government 
search of the employee’s home would clearly implicate the employee’s 
state and federal constitutional rights, including the employee’s right to 
privacy under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.5 
That provision provides that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”6 
Historically, courts have interpreted the “authority of law” requirement 
to mean a validly issued search warrant.7 
While the above hypothetical envisions a public computer contained 
inside a private home, it is not clear how the analysis would be 
3. Cf. Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark Cnty., Wash., 138 Wash. 2d 
950, 962, 983 P.2d 635, 642 (1999) (holding that engineering plans were “used” by the agency and 
were thus subject to disclosure under the PRA even though the plans were never possessed by the 
agency and remained in the possession of a private firm). A similar situation could arise where 
public records are contained on an employee’s private device but are inaccessible to the agency 
because of article I, section 7 protections. In that situation, the records would be “public” within the 
meaning of the PRA but would be in the possession of a private individual. 
4. The PRA does not include any provision that authorizes the issuance of a warrant or an 
administrative subpoena. See WASH. REV. CODE. ch. 42.56 (2014) (codifying the Public Records 
Act). 
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
6. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
7. See Charles W. Johnson & Scott P. Beetham, The Origin of Article I, Section 7 of the 
Washington State Constitution, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 431, 450 (2008).  
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materially different for a public record contained inside a private 
computer. A private computer or smartphone may contain considerable 
information on the private affairs of an individual.8 Recently, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a person’s smartphone is entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection against searches, much the same way as a 
person’s home.9 In other words, the government may not search either 
without a warrant.10 
This Comment argues that agencies lack the necessary “authority of 
law” under the PRA to compel inspection of a public employee or 
elected official’s private device. This Comment further argues that 
public employees do not forfeit their constitutional rights merely by 
working for government. Like the prohibition against government 
searching of a public employee’s home,11 government should not be 
permitted to search an individual’s private smartphone or computer 
without a valid warrant based on probable cause. However, the dilemma 
this creates for local governments and state agencies is substantial.12 It is 
plausible that agencies will be obligated under the PRA to disclose 
records that they cannot constitutionally access.13 In this situation, 
agencies should not face statutory penalties for failing to do the 
impossible. 
Tension between the PRA and Washington’s constitutional right to 
privacy has created a dilemma in which governments may have a duty to 
produce records they cannot constitutionally access. Part I of this 
Comment provides background on the PRA and its expansion in the 
digital age. Part I also provides background on the privacy protections of 
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and details the 
tensions that have arisen between article I, section 7 and the PRA. Part II 
of this Comment explores the dilemma facing Washington governments, 
details how the dilemma arose, and examines its causes. Part III suggests 
steps that the legislature should take to address the dilemma and ensure 
8. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493–95 (2014) (explaining that, for many 
Americans, modern smartphones contain the “privacies of life”). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home 
invaded, without authority of law.”). 
12. See infra Part II (discussing the origins of the dilemma and possible solutions). 
13. See Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark Cnty., Wash., 138 Wash. 
2d 950, 954 n.6, 962, 983 P.2d 635, 638 n.6, 642 (1999) (holding that agency had a duty to produce 
records apparently held subject to the discretion of a third party); infra Part II.B (arguing that 
agencies should not face statutory penalties for failing to produce records they do not have access 
to). 
 
                                                     
18 - Paine_FinalAuthorReview (Complete) (Mar. 18 2015).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  12:10 PM 
548 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:545 
that the PRA strikes an appropriate balance between personal privacy 
and open access to government records. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE: CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY IN 
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ERA 
A. The Washington Public Records Act 
On November 7, 1972 the voters of Washington State 
overwhelmingly adopted ballot Initiative Measure 276 (“Initiative 276”), 
enacting into law what would become the Washington Public Disclosure 
Act (PDA).14 The initiative was part of a broad societal push to provide 
transparency in government operations, particularly in the area of 
campaign finance.15 The initiative was enormously popular and enjoyed 
the support of seventy-two percent of Washington voters.16 Today we 
know the public records part of the original PDA as the Washington 
Public Records Act (PRA),17 a “strongly worded mandate for broad 
disclosure of public records.”18 
Initiative 276 was more focused on campaign finance transparency 
than on the disclosure of government records.19 The 1972 law prescribed 
a variety of disclosure rules for government officials, candidates, and 
lobbyists,20 and it was these campaign finance provisions that drew the 
majority of debate and media coverage at the time.21 Candidates for 
14. DAVID CUILLIER ET AL., THE HISTORY AND INTENT OF INITIATIVE 276, WHICH WAS PASSED 
BY VOTERS IN WASHINGTON STATE TO CREATE THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACT 1 (2004); see also 
Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, §§ 25–34, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 21–25. 
15. CUILLIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1–2. 
16. Id.  
17. In 2005 the Washington State Legislature recodified, renumbered, and restyled the public 
records part of the larger public disclosure statute from title 42, chapter 17 to title 42, chapter 56 of 
the Revised Code of Washington. See Act of May 4, 2005, ch. 274, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 893. 
For the purposes of this Comment, “Public Records Act” and “PRA” refer to the modern 
codification. 
18. Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 178 Wash. 2d 686, 694–95, 310 P.3d 1252, 1257 (2013) (citing 
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978)). 
19. See CUILLIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that “[t]he impetus and main focus of the 
initiative was on campaign finance disclosure”); Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, §§ 25–34, 1973 
Wash. Sess. Laws 21–25. 
20. See Initiative Measure No. 276, §§ 3–14, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 5–12 (requiring 
candidates to disclose campaign contributions); id. §§ 15–23, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 12–18 
(requiring lobbyists to register and barring lobbyists from certain activities); id. § 24, 1973 Wash. 
Sess. Laws at 18–20 (requiring candidates, elected officials, and family members to disclose 
financial interests). 
21. See CUILLIER ET AL., supra note 14, at 2. 
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political office were made to disclose both the source and size of their 
campaign contributions22 and lobbyists were required to register with the 
state government.23 However, a lasting impact of the initiative would be 
its requirement that state agencies and municipalities provide access to 
government records for inspection and copying.24 
The PRA generally requires state agencies, including municipal 
corporations, to make all records reflecting the workings of government 
available for public inspection and copying.25 The PRA defines “public 
record” expansively to include any “writing containing information 
relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any 
governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained 
by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or 
characteristics.”26 Generally, Washington courts have, consistent with 
the declared intent of the Act,27 construed the PRA’s disclosure 
provisions expansively, limited only by narrowly construed exceptions.28 
In other words, the PRA sweeps broadly, and only records that fit within 
the specific statutory exemptions may be withheld from its grasp.29 
The PRA provides a variety of procedural rules that agencies must 
follow to fully comply with the PRA’s mandate. For example, agencies 
must respond to records requests promptly.30 This means that within five 
business days an agency must either (1) provide the requested records, 
(2) provide a reasonable estimate of the time needed to fill the request, 
or (3) deny the request.31 If the request appears unclear, the agency may 
22. Initiative Measure No. 276, §§ 35–37, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 25–27. 
23. Id. § 15, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 12–13. 
24. See id. §§ 25–34, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 21–25. 
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2014) (establishing the duty of agencies to make 
records available for public inspection and copying). 
26. Id. § 42.56.010(3). 
27. Id. § 42.56.030 (“The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that 
serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide 
what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on 
remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have 
created.”). 
28. Id. (“This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed . . . .”); 
Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wash. 2d 398, 408, 259 P.3d 190, 194 
(2011) (quoting the same); Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008) 
(same). 
29. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Blaine Sch. Dist. No. 503, 86 Wash. App. 688, 695, 937 
P.2d 1176, 1179 (1997) (describing the purpose of the PRA as to “provide full access to nonexempt 
public records”). 
30. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.520. 
31. Id. 
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ask the requestor to provide clarification on the records being sought.32 
If the requestor fails to clarify the request, the agency need not respond 
to it.33 However, the extent to which a requestor must clarify a request is 
not apparent from the statute,34 but generally the requestor must request 
“identifiable public records.”35 This does not, however, mean that 
requests must be narrowly tailored, or even specific.36 It is not 
uncommon for government agencies to be called on to produce 
thousands of documents in a single request.37 
The PRA imposes a duty on agencies to make such records available 
for inspection and copying.38 Essentially, the PRA requires agencies to 
produce, upon request, any document or “writing” that relates to the 
conduct of government or the performance of a government function, so 
long as that “writing” was used, prepared, owned, or retained by the 
agency.39 The PRA applies to most every type of government agency at 
the state, regional, county, and local level.40 The PRA, however, applies 
differently to the state legislature.41 The Act provides the legislature 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. (providing that agencies may, in acknowledging the receipt of a public records request 
that is unclear, seek clarification from the requestor but providing no standard or definition for 
“clarification”). 
35. Id. § 42.56.080; see also Bonamy v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. App. 403, 960 P.2d 447 (1998) 
(citing former WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.270). 
36. For an example, in Forbes v. City of Goldbar, 171 Wash. App. 857, 288 P.3d 384, 386 
(2012), Susan Forbes requested, in a single request, “[a]ll emails sent by or received by Dorothy 
Croshaw and all elected or appointed council, the Mayor and all City Staff, and Christopher Wright 
which in any way relates to Susan Forbes.” Forbes further noted that her request was “a purposeful 
broad public records request intended to obtain all emails (including any attachments to those 
emails) sent to or received by Dorothy Croshaw from any Gold Bar official, whether a 
governmental or private computer system or electronic device was used.” Id. 
37. See, e.g., West v. Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 163 Wash. App. 235, 251, 258 P.3d 78, 
86 (2011) (discussing the agency’s “Herculean efforts in producing thousands of pages of 
documents in response to West’s broad and complex request”). 
38. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (imposing a duty on agencies to make public records 
available for inspection and copying); id. § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public record”). 
39. Id. § 42.56.070(1) (requiring agencies to make public records available for inspection and 
copying); id. § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public” record). 
40. Id. § 42.56.010(1) (“‘Agency’ includes all state agencies and all local agencies. ‘State agency’ 
includes every state office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or other state agency. 
‘Local agency’ includes every county, city, town, municipal corporation, quasi-municipal 
corporation, or special purpose district, or any office, department, division, bureau, board, 
commission, or agency thereof, or other local public agency.”). 
41. See id. § 42.56.010(3) (“For the office of the secretary of the senate and the office of the chief 
clerk of the house of representatives, public records means legislative records as defined in RCW 
40.14.100 and also means the following: All budget and financial records; personnel leave, travel, 
and payroll records; records of legislative sessions; reports submitted to the legislature; and any 
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increased flexibility in responding to records requests to minimize 
interference in legislative business.42 Notably, courts are not included 
within the definition of “agency” and, therefore, the PRA does not apply 
to them.43 Recently, the Washington Court of Appeals for Division III 
applied the PRA to private entities in narrow cases where they are 
“functional equivalents” of governmental entities.44 
In 1999, the Washington State Supreme Court considered what it 
means for a document to be “used” within the meaning of the PRA.45 
The case, Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Public Utility District No. 1 of 
Clark County, Washington,46 led to a very broad definition of “use.”47 In 
that case, the Court held that a record is used when there exists a nexus 
between the “information at issue and an agency’s decision-making 
process.”48 In other words, “information that is reviewed, evaluated, or 
referred to and has an impact on an agency’s decision-making process” 
falls within the parameters of the PRA and must be disclosed to a 
requestor.49 Surprisingly, this remains true for records that the agency 
does not possess, or in fact, never possessed.50 
other record designated a public record by any official action of the senate or the house of 
representatives.”); id. § 42.56.070(9) (generally prohibiting the secretary and the chief clerk from 
selling records for commercial purpose); id. § 42.56.090 (requiring the secretary of the senate and 
chief clerk of the house, along with all other agencies, to post hours for public access to records on 
their respective websites). 
42. See id. § 42.56.100 (allowing the secretary of the senate and the office of the chief clerk of the 
house to adopt “reasonable procedures allowing for the time, resource, and personnel constraints 
associated with legislative sessions”). 
43. City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 345–46, 217 P.3d 1172, 1173–74 (2008) 
(holding that the PRA does not apply to the judiciary because a court is not a “state or local 
agency”); see also Nast v. Michels, 107 Wash. 2d 300, 307, 730 P.2d 54, 58 (1986) (holding that the 
PRA does not apply to the courts). 
44. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 191–92, 181 
P.3d 881, 884–85 (2008) (holding that a privately run animal care center that contracted with the 
county animal control authority was a public agency subject to PRA requests). For more discussion 
on this case and its implications, see Jefferey A. Ware, Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control 
Shelter: How Did Private Businesses Become Government “Agencies” Under the Washington 
Public Records Act?, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741 (2010). 
45. Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark Cnty., Wash., 138 Wash. 2d 
950, 983 P.2d 635 (1999). 
46. 138 Wash. 2d 950, 983 P.2d 635 (1999). 
47. Id. at 960–61, 983 P.2d at 641 (reasoning that the critical inquiry necessary for determining 
“use” under the PRA is whether the “requested information bears a nexus with the agency’s 
decision-making process”). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 954–55, 983 P.2d at 639 (explaining that the Public Utility District did not possess 
the technical document sought by requestors). 
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In Concerned Ratepayers, the public utility district (PUD) had 
reviewed technical specifications for a certain type of turbine generator 
built by Cogentrix and General Electric (GE).51 The agency never 
possessed the technical plans sought by the requestors, but had instead 
reviewed them with Cogentrix and GE employees at Cogentrix’s North 
Carolina offices.52 Ultimately, the PUD decided not to purchase the 
turbines and at no point came to possess the technical portion of the 
plans.53 Nonetheless, the Court held that the technical specifications 
were public records subject to disclosure, remanding the case only for 
determination of whether an exemption applied.54 In so doing, the Court 
created a situation where an agency might have a duty to disclose a 
“public record” that (1) it never possessed, and (2) it likely could not 
obtain.55 There is no mention anywhere in the Court’s opinion of what 
steps the agency should take to secure the requested records from GE 
should no exemptions apply to prevent its disclosure.56 Thus it appears 
that an agency may have a duty to produce a “public record” that it does 
not possess and may have no reliable way to obtain. 
As government has moved into the computer age, the PRA has been 
adapted to encompass the wide variety of digital records that are now 
produced by agency employees. However, the PRA’s adaption to 
electronic records has not been without problems. In particular, the 
tension between the powerful disclosure law and the personal privacy of 
public employees has become an issue that is starting to find its way into 
Washington’s courts.57 
B. The Public Records Act in the Digital Age 
The number of records available under the PRA has been greatly 
expanded by the information age.58 The original PDA initiative was 
51. Id. at 961, 983 P.2d at 641. 
52. Id. at 954, 983 P.2d at 639. 
53. Id. at 954–55, 983 P.2d at 639. 
54. See id. at 963–64, 983 P.2d at 643. 
55. The Court’s discussion of the PUD’s interaction with GE about the technical specifications 
suggests that the PUD would only have been able to obtain the records with GE’s consent. See id. at 
954 n.6, 983 P.2d at 638 n.6. 
56. See generally id. It is difficult to imagine a legal mechanism that would allow a public utility 
district to secure copies of a private corporation’s technical product documents for disclosure to a 
citizen’s group.  
57. See, e.g., Nissen v. Pierce Cnty., 183 Wash. App. 581, 333 P.3d 577 (2014). 
58. See Joshua Brustein, Cop Cams Face Threat from Transparency Law in Washington State, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-11-26/ 
cop-cams-face-threat-from-transparency-law-in-washington-state (explaining that the cost of 
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conceived in the 1970s without the benefit of foresight to the 
proliferation of e-mail and other electronic record keeping. Historically, 
records were available only locally and were often difficult and time-
consuming to inspect.59 By contrast, today, public records across the 
nation are increasingly stored in centralized databases in electronic 
format, allowing requestors to retrieve and examine records anywhere.60 
Importantly, the internet revolution has fundamentally changed the 
nature of intra-agency communication and work product since the PDA 
was originally voted into law.61 Email and other electronic messaging 
services preserve almost every aspect of an agency’s operation for 
subsequent inspection under the PRA.62 Business that was once done 
over the phone or in person migrated to email and other forms of 
electronic communication.63 These changes have allowed employees to 
complying with PRA requests for body cam footage may prevent police departments from 
deploying the cameras in Washington State); Chris Luther, Rising Costs of Public Records Requests 
Concerns Cities Across Washington, NBC RIGHT NOW (Dec. 1, 2014, 6:45 PM), 
http://www.nbcrightnow.com/story/27521079/rising-costs-of-public-records-requests-concerns-
cities-across-washington (explaining that the number of records requests received by the City of 
Yakima has increased by 280% since 2011). 
59. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002). 
60. Id. at 1139–40. 
61. Consider, for example, that much of the communication that was once done over the phone or 
in person is today done via email. Unlike a phone call or in-person meeting, emails are “writings” 
and most must be preserved as public records. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 42.56.010(3) (2014); 
O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 147–48, 240 P.3d 1149 (2010) (explaining that 
both an email and its embedded metadata are public records subject to disclosure under the PRA). 
62. Cf. WENDY GINSBURG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43165, RETAINING AND PRESERVING 
FEDERAL RECORDS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 
(2013) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43165.pdf (noting that “[n]ew and emerging 
technologies have continuously allowed federal agencies to create and accumulate more records, 
complicating and adding costs to record collection, retention, and preservation”). The administrative 
burden of responding and complying with public records requests is tremendous. Consider the broad 
language used to define “public record” and the substantial number of records that are produced, 
and must then be stored and cataloged, every single day at a large agency. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.56.010(3) provides: “‘Public record’ includes any writing containing information relating to 
the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function 
prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or 
characteristics . . . .” This broad definition of a “public record” is supplemented by an equally broad 
definition of a “writing.” WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(4) provides: 
‘Writing’ means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every 
other means of recording any form of communication or representation including, but not 
limited to, letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combination thereof, and all papers, 
maps, magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films and prints, motion picture, film and video 
recordings, magnetic or punched cards, discs, drums, diskettes, sound recordings, and other 
documents including existing data compilations from which information may be obtained or 
translated. 
63. See Natalia Burg, How Technology Has Changed Workplace Communication, FORBES (Dec. 
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be far more productive from a variety of locations and have led to a 
surge in the amount of work that is done remotely and through private 
devices.64 Facing increasingly broad records requests, cities and 
agencies are forced to expend considerable sums to identify and 
disentangle private information from records that relate to public 
business.65 Some “transitory” documents may be deleted, but most must 
be preserved according to a retention schedule published by each 
agency.66 
Modern record-keeping technology provides the public unparalleled 
access to the inner workings of government, but that access is not 
without cost.67 Cities, counties, and state agencies must dedicate 
significant staff time to responding to and complying with public record 
requests, all of which comes at an increasing cost to taxpayers.68 During 
the early 1970s, opponents of Initiative 276 highlighted the substantial 
cost to taxpayers of the proposed law, noting that increased costs of 
$2 million was a conservative estimate, but that the true cost to the state, 
cities, and towns was impossible to project.69 In the modern era of 
electronic record keeping, the cost to taxpayers of complying with 
10, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/unify/2013/12/10/how-technology-has-changed-
workplace-communication/ (explaining how face-to-face meetings have given way to conference 
calls and email chains).  
64. See Neil Shah, More Americans Working Remotely, WALL ST. J. (March 5, 2013, 5:49 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324539404578342503214110478 (arguing 
that more Americans are working remotely than ever before). 
65. See, e.g., Mike Schechter, Gold Bar Meets Gold Standard of Records Request Response; Still 
Costs City a Pretty Penny, LOCAL OPEN GOV’T BLOG (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.localopengovernment.com/tags/washington-state-court-of-appe/. 
66. “Transitory” emails may generally be deleted under most agencies’ retention schedules, but if 
they are not, they then become public records under the PRA. See, e.g., Sound Cities Ass’n Records 
Retention Policy, SOUND CITIES ASS’N, http://soundcities.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ 
public-records-request/Records%20Retention%20Policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). Retention 
schedules differ, but most require emails to be stored for several years at a minimum. 
67. The monetary cost to taxpayers grows out of the substantial administrative burden of storing 
and complying with public record requests as well the costs related to litigating public records 
lawsuits. For example, the State of Washington paid out nearly $1.7 million relating to public record 
lawsuits in 2011. See State Paying Record Amount for Records Lawsuits, KING5.COM (Oct. 26, 
2013, 4:06 PM), http://www.king5.com/news/investigators/Public-records-lawsuits-138457009.html. 
68. See, e.g., Robin S. Jenkinson, An Approach to Responding to Public Records Requests, 
WASH. ST. ASS’N OF MUN. ATT’YS, available at http://mrsc.org/getmedia/749F84D3-B29B-4E52-
AC1C-6F0FC080754D/f13-pra.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (explaining that the City of Kirkland 
spends approximately 4500 employee hours responding to public records requests at an annual cost 
of about $375,000). 
69. WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET (GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 7, 
1972) 11 (1972), available at http://digitalarchives.wa.gov/WA.Media/do/DFC8D5869319A6C935 
A0699CFB0C027A.pdf. 
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Washington’s Public Records Act suggests that the opponent’s concerns 
were well founded.70 However, administrative costs are only part of the 
cost equation; agencies and municipalities may face aggressive statutory 
penalties and significant attorney fee awards when they fail to 
adequately respond to often voluminous and wide-ranging public record 
requests.71 The availability of a potential windfall creates an incentive 
for requestors to over-request desired records, and then pursue litigation 
if the agency fails to adequately comply with the PRA’s strict 
provisions.72 There is no relevancy requirement and agencies may not 
deny a request for being overbroad.73 This windfall incentive is arguably 
behind the increasing size and scope of public record requests.74 
70. A recent public records request filed against Energy Northwest by a Portland-based 
consulting firm may take two years and cost as much as $3 million to comply with. The broad 
request may contain over 150,000 documents and will require the utility to hire outside assistance in 
producing the requested records. Ultimately, the cost of the request will be passed on to Energy 
Northwest’s ratepayers. As is the case with all public records requests, it is the public that ends up 
paying. See Our Voice: Public Records Requests Shouldn’t be Vindictive, TRI-CITY HERALD, Apr. 
1, 2014, at A6; Jenkinson, supra note 68, at 3 (describing administrative costs of complying with 
the PRA for the City of Kirkland). 
71. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 42.56.550(4) (2014) (“Any person who prevails against an agency 
in any action in the courts seeking the right to inspect or copy any public record or the right to 
receive a response to a public record request within a reasonable amount of time shall be awarded 
all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in connection with such legal action. In 
addition, it shall be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not to exceed 
one hundred dollars for each day that he or she was denied the right to inspect or copy said public 
record.”). In recent years, the size and frequency of taxpayer-funded payouts has been on the rise, 
increasing from $108,000 in 2006 to $1.7 million in 2011. See State Paying Record Amount for 
Records Lawsuits, supra note 67. 
72. For example, a requestor seeking a wide range of information has little incentive to be 
specific in his request because if the agency fails to produce a responsive record, the requestor may 
enjoy a significant windfall in subsequent litigation, including attorney’s fees. See WASH. REV. 
CODE § 42.56.550(4); Wash. State Dep’t of Transp. v. Mendoza de Sugiyama, 182 Wash. App. 588, 
592–93, 330 P.3d 209, 211 (2014) (requestor’s broad request covered over 174,000 emails). The 
availability of attorney’s fees arguably also removes much of the disincentive to pursue litigation. 
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.080 (“Agencies shall not deny a request for identifiable public 
records solely on the basis that the request is overbroad. Agencies shall not distinguish among 
persons requesting records, and such persons shall not be required to provide information as to the 
purpose for the request except to establish whether inspection and copying would violate RCW 
42.56.070(9) or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or 
records to certain persons.”). 
74. Former Washington State Attorney General Rob McKenna suggested that the increase in 
State payouts relating to public records lawsuits was at least partially caused by people gaming the 
system. He noted that “[t]he fact is something very important has happened over the last decade. 
There are a relative handful of individuals, including inmates, who have figured out they can make a 
lot of money gaming the system.” State Paying Record Amount for Records Lawsuits, supra note 67 
(quoting former Washington State Attorney General Rob McKenna). McKenna further elaborated 
on the cost to taxpayers, arguing that “the whole regime, the whole system of public records and 
transparency is threatened by ridiculous litigation . . . . I don’t think that’s what the public records 
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Nonetheless, there are exemptions contained in the PRA, including a 
scant few designed to protect the privacy of public employees and 
elected officials. 
C. Statutory Privacy Protection in the PRA 
The PRA contains several statutory provisions designed to prevent the 
release of records that might seriously compromise the privacy interests 
of public employees or elected officials. Public employees, appointees, 
and elected officials have their personal information specifically 
protected from disclosure, but only to the extent that disclosure would 
violate their “right to privacy” as defined in RCW 42.56.050. The Act 
provides that “personal privacy,” as used within the PRA, “is invaded or 
violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) [w]ould 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate 
concern to the public.”75 Some additional provisions provide privacy 
exemptions for certain kinds of sensitive information such as 
confidential income data76 and a variety of personal information that 
may be stored by government agencies, such as addresses, telephone 
numbers, and social security numbers.77 
However, the statutory privacy exemptions78 do not protect against 
many releases of private employee information as the exemptions are 
limited by their text to preventing only a narrow scope of disclosures. 
On the whole, the Act provides only very limited privacy exemptions for 
public employees, and generally requires that, where feasible, redacted 
documents be released to protect privacy interests in lieu of total 
exemption.79 Moreover, a requestor may still obtain otherwise exempt 
“private” records “if the superior court in the county in which the record 
is maintained finds, after a hearing with notice thereof to every person in 
interest and the agency, that the exemption of such records is clearly 
unnecessary to protect any individual’s right of privacy.”80 The privacy 
provisions operate to exempt from disclosure only a narrow slice of 
act was intended for. I don’t think it was intended for people to make money.” Id. 
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (defining invasion of privacy for purposes of the privacy 
exemptions contained in the PRA). 
76. Id. § 42.56.210(1) (exempting confidential income data from disclosure under the PRA). 
77. Id. § 42.56.230(3) (exempting a variety of personal, financial, and tax information such as 
addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, social security numbers, credit card numbers). 
78. See id. §§ 42.56.210, 42.56.230. 
79. See id. § 42.56.210 (providing that the privacy exemptions listed in the PRA are inapplicable 
to the extent that [private] information can be deleted from the specific records sought). 
80. Id. § 42.56.210(2). 
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personal information and in a sense, their language more closely 
resembles a privacy tort than Washington’s constitutional privacy 
right.81 
D. Article I, Section 7: Washington’s Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution grants 
individuals a broad right of personal privacy that is independent of the 
federal Bill of Rights. The section states that “[n]o person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law.”82 For roughly sixty years, the Washington State Supreme Court 
construed the language of article I, section 7 to be functionally 
equivalent to the privacy protections provided by the Fourth Amendment 
to the federal constitution.83 However, this began to change with the 
1980 case State v. Simpson,84 when the Court finally gave effect to the 
“significant disparity in language between the two provisions.”85 Today, 
under the Washington State Constitution, an individual has a clearly 
recognized right to privacy with no express limitations.86 
Article I, section 7 is “qualitatively different from the Fourth 
Amendment and provides greater protections.”87 Rather than a court 
inquiring whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, a 
search occurs under article I, section 7 whenever the government 
disturbs “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, 
and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a 
warrant.”88 Article I, section 7 has produced a substantial and sustained 
divergence between the Washington State Supreme Court and the United 
81. Compare id. § 42.56.050 (defining invasion of privacy for purposes of the PRA), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (1977) (outlining the tort of “publicity given to 
private life”), and WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (outlining the right to personal privacy guaranteed by 
the Washington State Constitution). 
82. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
83. Johnson & Beetham, supra note 7, at 431. 
84. 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). 
85. Johnson & Beetham, supra note 7, at 432; see also ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, 
THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 31 ( 2013) (explaining that the Washington State Supreme 
Court’s swing away from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence began in 1978). 
86. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 180, 867 P.2d 593, 596 (1994) (citation omitted). 
87. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014); see also State v. Ringer, 100 
Wash. 2d 686, 698–99, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Stroud, 
106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (describing a return to article I, section 7’s common law 
beginnings). 
88. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 181, 867 P.2d at 597 (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 
511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984)). 
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States Supreme Court on the increasingly important questions of search, 
seizure, and privacy in the modern era.89 Article I, section 7’s drafters 
rejected a proposal to adopt language identical to the Fourth Amendment 
and instead opted for the more nebulous language of article I, section 7 
despite the fact that the provision does not refer specifically to searches 
or seizures.90 In fact, article I, section 7’s drafters likely intended that the 
provision apply against “all invasions on the part of the 
government . . . of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of his 
life.”91 
Courts analyze a potential article I, section 7 violation under what is 
essentially a two-step process.92 First, a court examines whether there 
has been a disturbance of one’s “private affairs” or an invasion of one’s 
home.93 Such a disturbance triggers the protection of the constitutional 
provision.94 Second, a court examines whether “authority of law” 
justifies the government’s disturbance or invasion.95 
The first step of the analysis examines whether the privacy interest 
invaded is one that “those privacy interests which citizens of this state 
have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental 
trespass.”96 These interests may be quite broad. For example, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has recognized cognizable privacy 
interests in telephone numbers called,97 garbage,98 and thermal heat 
waste.99 The second step of the analysis focuses on the sufficiency of the 
government’s “authority of law” underlying the invasion.100 Generally, 
the authority of law required to access an individual’s private affairs is a 
valid warrant except for several narrow and closely drawn exceptions to 
89. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 85, at 31. 
90. Id. 
91. Johnson & Beetham, supra note 7, at 442 (quoting United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 629 
(1886) (Miller, J., concurring)). 
92. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 85, at 32 (describing article I, section 7 analysis as involving 
“two discrete steps”). 
93. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 270, 868 P.2d 134, 139 (1994). 
94. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994) (explaining that if no 
search has occurred then article I, section 7 is not implicated). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984)). 
97. See In re Maxwell, 133 Wash. 2d 332, 340, 945 P.2d 196, 200 (1997) (citing State v. 
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)). 
98. See id. at 339–40, 945 P.2d at 199–200 (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 
1112 (1990)). 
99. See id. (citing Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 867 P.2d 593). 
100. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 270, 868 P.2d 134, 139 (1994). 
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the warrant requirement.101 
Today the Washington State Supreme Court continues to extend 
article I, section 7’s privacy protections to new technologies. For 
example, in State v. Hinton,102 the court extended article I, section 7’s 
privacy protections to text message communications.103 The court 
explained that “[g]iven the realities of modern life, the mere fact that an 
individual shares information with another party and does not control the 
area from which that information is accessed does not place it outside 
the realm of article I, section 7’s protection.”104 Moreover, 
“technological advancements do not extinguish privacy interests that 
Washington citizens are entitled to hold.”105 Indeed, the court explained 
in Hinton that article I, section 7’s privacy protections are not confined 
to the subjective privacy expectations of modern citizens, which have 
likely been diminished by the increasing prevalence of surveillance 
technology.106 Rather, the state constitution bars the government from 
intruding upon those privacy interests the citizens of Washington “have 
held, and should be entitled to hold.”107 In other words, the protections 
offered by article I, section 7 are not static. The protections are adaptable 
and focused on an individual’s core privacy interests rather than being 
constrained by a specific type of technology. 
Because the protection of Washington’s article I, section 7 is distinct 
from that of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it 
might apply differently to new technologies. For example, the word 
“reasonable” does not appear anywhere in article I, section 7’s 
guarantee108 and Washington citizens’ privacy interests are not 
constrained by a “reasonable expectation” inquiry that might be affected 
by society’s increasing acceptance of reduced privacy.109 Washington 
101. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868–69, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014); see also State v. Miles, 
160 Wash. 2d 236, 243–44, 156 P.3d 864, 867–68 (2007). Examples of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement include consent, exigent circumstances, and searches incident to a valid arrest. See 
State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833, 837–38 (1999). 
102. 179 Wash. 2d 862, 319 P.3d 9. 
103. See id. at 877–78, 319 P.3d at 16–17 (holding that text messages sent by convicted narcotics 
purchaser were “private affairs” subject protection under article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution). 
104. Id. at 873, 319 P.3d at 15 (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 
154 (1984)). 
105. Id. at 870, 319 P.3d at 13. 
106. See id. at 873–74, 319 P.3d at 14–15. 
107. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994) (quoting Myrick, 102 
Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154). 
108. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
109. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d at 869–70, 319 P.3d at 12–13. 
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citizens hold significant privacy interests in their digital devices, such as 
laptops, tablets, or smartphones, despite the fact that some of the 
information those devices contain may be inadvertently viewed by 
others.110 While Washington’s Constitution can be characterized as 
especially protective of privacy,111 even the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized the extent to which one’s personal identity and 
private life are stored and catalogued by their smartphones.112 
Washington’s constitutional protection for individual privacy protects 
a public employee’s private affairs even where the PRA’s privacy 
exemptions are not applicable.113 The statutory privacy protections 
contained in the PRA are fundamentally different from the constitutional 
guarantee.114 That the PRA’s statutory privacy protections focus on 
protecting information that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person” demonstrate that the protections’ scope is constrained by a 
reasonableness inquiry not recognized by article I, section 7 
jurisprudence.115 While an argument can be made that public employees 
may lose any reasonable expectation of privacy in their electronic 
devices after using them for work-related business, a reasonableness test 
is not the appropriate inquiry under the Washington Constitution.116 
Instead, one’s private device, such as a computer or cellphone, is 
protected from search and seizure absent a warrant.117 Moreover, a 
110. See id. at 881, 319 P.3d at 18 (explaining that police may search a person’s cellphone “only 
with a warrant, a valid exception to the warrant requirement, or the phone owner’s express 
consent”). 
111. See id. at 868, 319 P.3d 9 at 12. 
112. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (explaining that for 
many Americans, modern smartphones contain the “privacies of life”). 
113. See In re Ways’ Marriage, 85 Wash. 2d 693, 703, 538 P.2d 1225, 1231 (1975) (“[I]t is our 
duty to avoid rendering a statute unconstitutional by interpretation if by an alternative interpretation 
we may render it constitutional.”); Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 155 Wash. 2d 
790, 816, 123 P.3d 88, 101 (2005) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (explaining that courts should avoid 
embracing statutory interpretations that will produce illegal or unconstitutional results). 
114. The article I, section 7 privacy right is not subject to any express limitations. See State v. 
Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 180, 867 P.2d 593, 596 (1994). A reasonableness inquiry, such as the 
PRA’s requirement that private information be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” would 
seem to be by definition an express limitation. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.50 (2014). Thus, while a 
public official may not rely on the statutory provision of the PRA to resist disclosure of private 
information that a reasonable person might find only moderately offensive, this does not mean that 
such disclosure could not be properly resisted on state constitutional grounds. 
115. See Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 180, 867 P.2d at 596 (stating that the right to privacy granted by 
article I, section 7 is not subject to any express limitations); Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d at 868, 319 P.3d 
at 12 (explaining that article I, section 7 protects from government intrusion those privacy interests 
Washington citizens “have held, and should be entitle to hold”). 
116. See Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 181, 867 P.2d at 597 (internal quotation omitted). 
117. See id. (“[Under the] Washington constitution the inquiry focuses on those privacy interests 
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warrant will only issue where there is a specific statutory provision 
authorizing its issuance.118 PRA violations are not criminal,119 and there 
is no authority to suggest that the Act can support the issuance of a 
warrant in Washington as no authorization statute can be found 
anywhere in the PRA’s statutory scheme.120 Finally, any argument that a 
public employee or elected official waives his article I, section 7 right to 
privacy by virtue of becoming a public employee or officer would seem 
to run counter to the supremacy of individual rights declared by article I, 
section 1 of the State Constitution.121 Moreover, such an argument is at 
odds with case law from the Washington State Court of Appeals.122 
II. APPLYING THE PRA TO “PRIVATE AFFAIRS” CREATES A 
DILEMMA 
A. Requiring Governmental inspection of a Private Computer Under 
the PRA Implicates the Protection of Article I, Section 7 
In the 2010 case O’Neill v. City of Shoreline,123 the Washington State 
Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, the applicability of the PRA 
to public records contained on a private computer. A sharply divided 
court, underscoring the tension between personal privacy and the PRA, 
held that the City of Shoreline had a duty to inspect the personal hard 
drive of its deputy mayor, and disclose any public records held 
therein.124 This remarkable result would set the stage for future public 
records lawsuits targeting public officials, including Nissen v. Pierce 
County,125 recently decided by the Washington State Court of Appeals 
which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental 
trespass absent a warrant.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
118. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 273–74, 868 P.2d 134, 140–41 (1994). 
119. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.56 (codifying the Washington Public Records Act). 
120. See generally id. Careful review of the statute reveals no provision that authorizes the 
issuance of a warrant. This is likely because, by design, the PRA applies to agencies rather than to 
individuals. 
121. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people, and 
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to 
protect and maintain individual rights.”). 
122. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 822, 10 P.3d 452, 466–67 (2000) 
(holding that applicants for public employment do not waive their privacy rights). 
123. 170 Wash. 2d 138, 240 P.3d 1149 (2010). 
124. Id. at 150, 240 P.3d at 1155 (“The City has a duty to provide records to the public that are 
subject to the PRA. RCW 42.56.070(1). Information that must be disclosed under the PRA 
conceivably exists on the hard drive of Fimia’s computer.”). 
125. 183 Wash. App. 581, 333 P.3d 577 (2014).  
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for Division II. 
In O’Neill, deputy mayor Fimia had received an email on her personal 
computer that accused the Shoreline City Council of improper conduct, 
supposedly sent on behalf of O’Neill.126 After Fimia disclosed the 
existence of the email at a city council meeting, O’Neill, who was also 
present, made an immediate oral request for the email.127 Fimia 
forwarded the email through her personal email account on her home 
computer, removing the “to” and “from” information, but otherwise 
providing the entire email to O’Neill.128 However, O’Neill was not 
satisfied with the disclosure and subsequently requested all information 
relating to the email, including how it was received and from whom it 
was sent.129 Fimia found the original unaltered email, including the 
forwarding information that indicated its original sender, and provided 
this to the city attorney for disclosure to O’Neill.130 
Despite this second disclosure, O’Neill remained unsatisfied, and she 
soon made a third request for all metadata131 associated with the entire 
email chain.132 Fimia was unable to find the metadata associated with the 
original email and concluded she must have inadvertently destroyed it; 
thus the city was unable to produce the requested information.133 In its 
place, the city provided O’Neill with metadata taken from an identical 
email sent to city council member Janet Way; however, O’Neill 
remained unsatisfied and brought suit under the PRA to compel 
disclosure of the specific metadata she had requested.134 
When the case finally came before the Washington State Supreme 
Court, two primary issues required resolution: (1) was the metadata 
associated with the email a public record; and (2) did the city have a 
duty to inspect Fimia’s personal computer in order to provide the 
126. O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 141–43, 240 P.3d at 1151–52. 
127. Id. at 142, 240 P.3d at 1151. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 143–44, 240 P.3d at 1151–52. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 143, 240 P.3d at 1151 (stating that “[m]etadata is most clearly defined as ‘data about 
data’ or hidden information about electronic documents created by software programs”) (citing 
Jembaa Cole, When Invisible Electronic Ink Leaves Red Faces: Tactical, Legal and Ethical 
Consequences of the Failure to Remove Metadata, 1 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 7 (2005)). 
Metadata presents other interesting issues relating to the PRA because often, especially in the realm 
of telecommunications, metadata may only be stored in the private servers of a corporation that 
provides communication services. 
132. O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 143, 240 P.3d at 1151. 
133. Id. at 143–44, 240 P.3d at 1151–52. 
134. Id. 
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requested metadata?135 The Court answered yes to both questions, 
suggesting that the City could be found to have violated the PRA if it 
failed to “search” Fimia’s home computer for the requested record.136 
However, the court noted in a footnote that “[w]e address only whether 
the City may inspect Fimia’s home computer if she gives consent to the 
inspection. We do not address whether the City may inspect Fimia’s 
home computer absent her consent.”137 This qualification means the 
court did not consider the constitutional privacy questions raised by a 
mandated inspection. However, it also means the Court did nothing to 
help resolve the tension between the PRA and a public employee’s right 
to privacy. That task has been left, so far, to the lower courts though 
nothing approaching a resolution has yet emerged.138 Nonetheless, the 
majority’s qualification suggests that the Justices were acutely aware of 
the potential constitutional dimension the case could undertake if Fimia 
refused to produce the requested hard drive. 
Justice Alexander authored a dissent in O’Neill, which was joined by 
the three other justices who similarly took issue with the majority’s 
reasoning.139 In particular, Justice Alexander argued that the even if the 
metadata on Fimia’s home computer was a public record; it was exempt 
from disclosure under the statutory privacy exceptions of RCW 
42.56.050140 and 42.56.230.141 Those provisions provide statutory 
exemptions from disclosure when certain privacy rights of public 
employees would be implicated by the requested materials, though the 
135. See id. at 144–45, 250 P.3d at 1152. 
136. Id. at 150–51, 240 P.3d at 1155 (“If, on remand, the City refuses to inspect Fimia’s home 
computer’s hard drive for the metadata, the trial court should find that the City violated the PRA, as 
the City will not have provided the O’Neills with the requested metadata.”). 
137. Id. at 150 n.4, 240 P.3d at 1155 n.4. 
138. See, e.g., Nissen v. Pierce Cnty., 183 Wash. App. 581, 333 P.3d 577 (2014). This case 
presented an opportunity for the Court of Appeals to explore the relation of article I, section 7 to an 
elected official’s privacy in the context of the PRA. However, the court ultimately remanded the 
case without reaching the constitutional arguments. Id. at 596, 333 P.3d at 585. 
139. See O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 154–56, 240 P.3d at 1157–58 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
140. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (2014) (“A person’s ‘right to privacy,’ ‘right of privacy,’ 
‘privacy,’ or ‘personal privacy,’ as these terms are used in this chapter, is invaded or violated only if 
disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. The provisions of this chapter dealing with the 
right to privacy in certain public records do not create any right of privacy beyond those rights that 
are specified in this chapter as express exemptions from the public’s right to inspect, examine, or 
copy public records.”). 
141. See O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 155, 240 P.3d at 1157–58; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230 
(exempting from disclosure under the PRA some personal information that would violate the 
privacy rights of public employees, including elected officials). 
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bar for exemption is quite high.142 Moreover, he took issue with the 
majority’s determination that an unsolicited email sent to a city official’s 
private email account, accessed on her home computer, could be 
considered a “public record” subject to disclosure under the PRA.143 In 
Justice Alexander’s view, the city had fully met its obligations under the 
PRA and should not be penalized for failing to conduct an impermissible 
search of Deputy Mayor Fimia’s private computer.144 
Although Justice Alexander never expressly invoked article I, section 
7 of the State Constitution in the text of his dissent, he did reference it in 
a footnote and it seems to undergird much of his argument.145 
Specifically, Justice Alexander noted that the private nature of Fimia’s 
personal hard drive “would necessarily be compromised by an 
‘inspection’ or ‘search’ of the sort the majority orders.”146 Thus, he 
argued, because the information on Fimia’s personal hard drive would 
be private and protected by article I, section 7, Fimia would be within 
her rights to refuse to consent to the City’s inspection absent a 
warrant.147 Consequently, under this scenario the City should not be held 
to have violated the PRA and should not be assessed statutory penalties 
if it failed to conduct an illegal search.148 
Eventually, however, the Washington State Supreme Court may have 
to resolve the tension between article I, section 7 and the disclosure 
requirements of the PRA. Nissen v. Pierce County149 may be a case that 
eventually requires the Court to confront analogous issues. In the lead-
up to the Nissen case, Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist 
explicitly refused to turn over text messages and certain phone records 
relating to the allegations of misconduct against deputy Nissen, relying 
both on the statutory privacy protections of the PRA and the 
constitutional privacy protection of article I, section 7.150 The case is 
significant because it directly raises the issue of whether work-related 
142. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.56.050, 42.56.230; supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text. 
143. See O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 156, 240 P.3d at 1158 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. at 156–57, 240 P.3d at 1158. 
145. Id. at 155 n.1, 240 P.3d at 1157 n.1. 
146. Id. at 155, 240 P.3d at 1157. 
147. Id. at 155, 240 P.3d at 1158. (“Because a public employee, including an elected official like 
Fimia, would be well within his or her rights to refuse an inspection or a search by the employer of 
his or her home computer, the employee’s privacy right trumps any direction to the public employer 
to examine the hard drive of the employee’s home computer.”). 
148. Id. at 156, 240 P.3d at 1158. 
149. 183 Wash. App. 581, 333 P.3d 577 (2014). 
150. Brief of Respondent at 27, 39, Nissen v. Pierce Cnty., 183 Wash. App. 581, 333 P.3d 577 
(2014). 
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text messages sent from a private phone are disclosable under the PRA 
when the agency involved cannot retrieve the requested messages.151 
The background facts are somewhat convoluted, but the case boils 
down to a public records request by Pierce County Sheriff’s Deputy 
Glenda Nissen for text messages and corresponding phone records from 
Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist.152 Nissen believes that text 
messages sent by Lindquist on his private cell phone may support her 
claim that he falsely accused her of sending a death threat to a former 
sheriff’s department employee.153 Lindquist initially provided redacted 
phone records to the County to disclose to Nissen; however, Lindquist 
never volunteered to provide the text messages and the sum of his 
disclosures was not sufficient to stop Nissen from filing suit under the 
PRA.154 
The posture of Nissen ultimately led the Court of Appeals for 
Division II to a fairly limited holding that did not resolve the underlying 
suit. The case reached the court of appeals as an appeal of the superior 
court’s grant of Pierce County’s CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Because 
of this posture, the court of appeals concluded that additional fact-
finding in the superior court was necessary and that it could not, on the 
record before the court on appeal, conclude whether Lindquist’s private 
phone records were “public records” within the meaning of the PRA.155 
The court of appeals explicitly did not reach the constitutional 
question.156 The court remanded the case to the superior court with 
orders that Nissen’s complaint be reinstated and a record developed 
sufficient to determine whether Lindquist’s personal cell phone text 
messages and call logs pertained to the conduct of government business 
and thus were public records.157 Nonetheless, Nissen provides insight 
into how courts determine whether records that share private and public 
qualities are ultimately “public,” subject to disclosure under the PRA.158 
151. Pat Jenkins, Can a Public Official’s Private Phone be Public?, DISPATCH (Apr. 1, 2014, 
1:28 PM), http://www.dispatchnews.com/2014/04/01/can-a-public-officials-private-phone-be-
public/. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. See Nissen v. Pierce Cnty., 183 Wash. App. 581, 596, 333 P.3d 577, 585 (2014) (remanding 
for discovery to establish the record necessary to determine whether requested records are public 
records). 
156. Id. (“Because we remand to the superior court, we do not address Nissen’s and Lindquist’s 
constitutional privacy arguments.”). 
157. Id. at 598, 333 P.3d at 585–86.  
158. See generally id. 
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Because the court did not determine that the requested records were 
public records within the reach of the PRA,159 it did not reach the 
applicability of the statutory privacy protections of the Act. Nonetheless, 
in granting Pierce County’s CR 12(b)(6) motion, the superior court 
apparently examined the application of the PRA privacy statutes.160 
While the Nissen decision provided little additional clarity into the 
tension between personal privacy and the PRA, it does seem to support 
the ongoing vitality of O’Neill and the rationale of the majority in that 
case.161 Specifically, the Nissen court noted that in determining whether 
the requested text messages were public records, it was “immaterial” 
that government-business-related messages were contained in a personal 
cellular phone.162 While the court may be correct that it is “immaterial” 
that the messages were contained on a private device for determining 
whether the communications constitute “public records,” the private 
nature of the device is certainly material to the applicability of statutory 
and constitutional privacy protections.163 As Justice Alexander 
recognized in his dissent in O’Neill, a court-directed examination of a 
private hard drive, such as one contained in a smartphone, likely 
implicates its owner’s privacy rights in the information contained on the 
device.164 Thus, the Nissen court’s determination that public records may 
be created and contained on a private cellphone165 is consistent with the 
O’Neill Court’s determination that public records may be contained on a 
private computer. However, neither case squarely addresses the 
constitutional privacy issues lurking in the background.166 
159. Id. at 598, 333 P.3d at 585–86. 
160. See id. at 588 n.9, 333 P.3d at 581 n.9 (finding that RCW 42.56.050, the PRA exemption 
designed to protect against invasions of privacy, applies to the phone records at issue in the case). 
161. See id. at 594, 333 P.3d at 583 (“Our Supreme Court has refused to exempt personal device 
communications from records subject to the PRA, stating ‘[i]f government employees could 
circumvent the PRA by using their home computers for government business, the PRA could be 
drastically undermined.’” (quoting O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 150, 240 P.3d 
1149, 1155 (2010))). 
162. Id. 
163. See O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 155, 240 P.3d at 1157 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
majority provides no authority of law for the proposition that a city employee’s home computer is 
subject to such a search or inspection by the employing city.”). 
164. See id. 
165. Nissen, 183 Wash. App. at 595–96, 333 P.3d at 584–85. 
166. See generally O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 155, 240 P.3d at 1157; Nissen, 183 Wash. App. at 
596, 333 P.3d at 585. 
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B. The PRA Does Not Provide Agencies with the Necessary 
“Authority of Law” to Inspect a Private Device Protected Under 
Article I, Section 7 
If in responding to a public records request, an agency determines that 
a public record exists only on an employee’s private device, can the 
agency constitutionally require inspection of that device and recover the 
record without the employee’s consent? If a court decides that electronic 
records stored on a personal device are “public records” for purposes of 
the PRA, can it compel a public employee or elected official to produce 
the device for inspection? The answers to these questions and many like 
them are not entirely clear, but the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
prior article I, section 7 decisions suggest that the “authority of law” 
required to disturb an individual’s private affairs cannot be grounded 
solely in the PRA.167 Moreover, an additional wrinkle appears in the fact 
that a court’s power of judicial review applies only to the agency’s 
response to a record request.168 In other words, a court’s power to 
enforce the PRA flows from its power to review agency actions; attorney 
fees and statutory penalties are only available to a party that has 
prevailed “against an agency.”169 As such, the court’s power to compel 
the production of records and impose statutory penalties may be applied 
against the agency itself, but not necessarily against the individual 
employee or official in physical possession of the disputed records.170 
Washington’s courts have long recognized that once a matter is 
deemed “private” under article I, section 7, a search must only be 
conducted with “authority of law,” or “in other words, a [valid] 
167. The PRA does not contain an authorizing statute and, like the housing at issue in State v. 
Walker, does not provide for criminal sanctions for violations. See 101 Wash. App. 1, 6, 999 P.2d 
1296, 1299 (2000) (“[I]n the absence of a specific authorizing statute or court rule, a court may not 
constitutionally issue an administrative search warrant even with probable cause, at least where the 
reason for issuance is a non-criminal housing code violation.” (emphasis in original)). 
168. See generally WASH. REV. CODE. § 42.56.550 (2014) (describing the courts’ power of 
judicial review over agency actions). 
169. Id. § 42.56.550(4) (“Any person who prevails against an agency in any action in the courts 
seeking the right to inspect or copy any public record or the right to receive a response to a public 
record request within a reasonable amount of time shall be awarded all costs, including reasonable 
attorney fees, incurred in connection with such legal action. In addition, it shall be within the 
discretion of the court to award such person an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars for each 
day that he or she was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record.”). 
170. Id. § 42.56.550 (explaining that judicial review under the PRA is available for agency 
action). But see Memorandum Opinion on Violation of the Public Records Act, Paulson v. City of 
Bainbridge Island, No. 13-2-01839-1 (Kitsap Cnty. Super. Ct., Wash., May 29, 2014) (directing 
plaintiffs to petition the court for mandamus should the City fail to turn over councilmembers 
personal hard drives for inspection). 
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warrant.”171 Specifically, “authority of law” has historically meant a 
government disturbance or invasion conducted pursuant to a valid 
warrant or subpoena issued by a neutral magistrate or other authorized 
government entity.172 Local governments do not possess a common law 
right to issue a search warrant in Washington.173 Instead, “Washington’s 
long-standing tradition of limiting search warrants to carefully 
circumscribed statutory categories provides powerful support for the 
proposition that Const. art. I, § 7 prohibits courts from issuing warrants 
without an authorizing statute or court rule.”174 For example, an agency 
may not inspect a tenant’s apartment based on a warrant issued by a 
superior court if the court was not expressly authorized to issue such a 
warrant.175 Rather, for a search based on less than probable cause, courts 
are granted authority to issue search warrants only if authorized by a 
specific statute or court rule.176 Stated another way, an administrative 
search warrant must be supported by either: (1) an authorizing statute or 
court rule or (2) “by allegations of a criminal violation supported by 
probable cause.”177 Moreover, the authority of a court to issue a warrant 
on less than probable cause is not to be implied from a statute, even one 
that grants inspectors a right of entry for enforcement purposes.178 
Rather, the legislature has crafted a number of statutes that explicitly 
authorize courts to issue administrative search warrants in support of the 
enforcement of specific laws.179 
The PRA does not contain a statutory provision explicitly authorizing 
the issuance of a warrant nor does it contain an administrative subpoena 
171. York v. Wahiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wash. 2d 297, 306, 178 P.3d 995, 1001 (2008). 
172. Johnson & Beetham, supra note 7, at 450 (citations omitted). 
173. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 273–74, 868 P.2d 134, 141 (1994). 
174. Id. at 274, 868 P.2d at 141. 
175. See id. at 272–73, 868 P.2d at 140–41 (explaining that an absolutely essential element of a 
valid warrant is that it be issued by a magistrate with the legal authority to issue it). 
176. Id. at 273, 868 P.2d at 141 (holding “that a superior court is not authorized either by the 
common law or by the state constitution to issue search warrants on less than probable cause in the 
absence of a statute or court rule”). 
177. City of Pasco v. Shaw, 161 Wash. 2d 450, 459, 166 P.3d 1157, 1162 (2007) (emphasis in 
original). 
178. See McCready, 123 Wash. 2d at 278, 868 P.2d at 143 (explaining that “a right of entry, and 
even an authorization to seek a warrant to implement a right of entry, is not equivalent to a 
legislative authorization for a court to issue a warrant on less than probable cause”). 
179. Id. at 278–89, 868 P.2d at 143–44 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 15.17.190 (horticultural 
grading laws); WASH. REV. CODE § 16.57.180 (livestock identification laws); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 17.24.021 (insects, pests, and plant diseases); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.94.260 (weights and 
measures laws); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.502 (pharmaceutical premises)). 
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provision.180 If the legislature intended to authorize the courts to 
judicially compel the disclosure of “private affairs” protected under 
article I, section 7, it seems reasonable that it would have provided at 
least some procedural mechanism in the statutory scheme.181 But there is 
none.182 Without such authorization, an attempt by a court to compel 
production of the “private affairs” of an individual, even for in camera 
review, would be of questionable legality under article I, section 7 
precedent.183 This was the view of the superior court judge in Nissen.184 
In setting forth the superior court’s reasoning for granting Pierce 
County’s CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the judge explained that the 
court had “no power to require a third-party provider [Verizon, where 
the text messages were stored], without a search warrant application 
with probable cause, to disclose records. [The court] ha[s] no power to 
do so under the PRA.”185 The trial judge’s statement reflects the fact that 
the PRA lacks a provision that would expressly authorize a court to issue 
an administrative search warrant. Without express authorization, only 
allegations of a criminal violation supported by probable cause are 
sufficient to support an administrative search warrant.186 
The PRA, as it currently exists, does not provide the “authority of 
law” necessary to overcome the privacy interests of public employees in 
their personal devices.187 No statute or court rule authorizes a magistrate 
to issue a search warrant based on a suspected violation of the PRA, nor 
is a violation of the Act a criminal offense.188 As such, an agency does 
not have the necessary “authority of law” to inspect a public employee’s 
private device against the employee’s will.189 The O’Neill190 court 
180. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.56 (2014) (codifying the Public Records Act).  
181. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.79.015 (2014) (authorizing a magistrate to issue a search 
warrant upon reasonable cause that certain conditions provided for in the statute, such as unlawful 
gambling or counterfeiting, are present); Shaw, 161 Wash. 2d at 459, 166 P.3d at 1161–62. 
182. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.56 (codifying the Public Records Act). 
183. See McCready, 123 Wash. 2d at 273–74, 868 P.2d at 140–41; State v. Walker, 101 Wash. 
App. 1, 6, 999 P.2d 1296, 1299 (2000). 
184. Nissen v. Pierce Cnty., 183 Wash. App. 581, 588 n.9, 333 P.3d 577, 581 n.9 (2014). 
185. Id. (emphasis in original). 
186. See Shaw, 161 Wash. 2d at 459, 166 P.3d at 1162. 
187. See generally WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.56 (codifying the Public Records Act). 
188. See generally id. 
189. See Shaw, 161 Wash. 2d at 459, 166 P.3d at 1161–62 (holding that an administrative search 
warrant must be supported by either (1) an authorizing statute or court rule or (2) allegations of a 
criminal violation which are supported by probable cause); City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 
2d 260, 278–79, 868 P.2d 134, 143 (1994) (explaining that statutory authority to issue a warrant 
must be express and not merely implied). 
190. O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 240 P.3d 1149 (2010). 
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implicitly recognized this issue, specifically qualifying its holding to 
apply only to a situation where the Deputy Mayor voluntarily produced 
what was undisputedly a “public record” sent to her private home 
computer.191 Even if the agency applied for a warrant to authorize the 
search, a court would have no authority to issue a search warrant based 
solely on the PRA.192 Because of this constitutional limitation on the 
authority of government, it is unfair to hold an agency in violation of the 
PRA for failing to produce records that are contained on the private 
computer or device of an employee or public official or otherwise 
protected by article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. 
III. ADDRESSING THE DILEMMA: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE 
FUTURE 
A. Agencies Should Not Face Statutory Penalties for Records They 
Do Not Possess and Cannot Obtain 
One immediate question that O’Neill raised but left unresolved is 
what would have happened had Fimia, Shoreline’s deputy mayor, 
refused to turn over her personal hard drive for inspection? The Court 
dodged this issue,193 and in so doing left government agencies without 
guidance on how to handle such a situation. In Concerned Ratepayers, 
the Court appeared to imply that the PUD could be held liable for failing 
to produce documents that were not in its physical possession.194 While 
fifteen years later it is difficult to know the precise factual context of that 
case, including the PUD’s ability at the time to obtain the turbine’s 
technical specifications from Cogentrix and GE, it nonetheless continues 
to appear that agencies have a duty to produce public records even when 
191. Id. at 150 n.4, 240 P.3d at 1155 n.4; see also id. at 155, 240 P.3d at 1157 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he majority provides no authority of law for the proposition that a city employee’s 
home computer is subject to such a search or inspection by the employing city. In my opinion, the 
home computer hard drive is not subject to search or inspection by the City without permission of 
the employee.”). 
192. See McCready, 123 Wash. 2d at 280–81, 868 P.2d at 144–45 (holding that warrants issued 
by superior court not authorized to do so by a statute or court rule were invalid and must be 
quashed). 
193. O’Neill, 170 Wash. 2d at 150 n.4, 240 P.3d at 1155 n.4 (explaining that the Court only 
addresses whether the City may inspect Fimia’s computer with consent, thus avoiding issues that 
might arise should she challenge such an inspection). 
194. Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark Cnty., Wash., 138 Wash. 2d 
950, 964, 983 P.2d 635, 642 (1999) (declining to award statutory penalties and attorney’s fees 
because further fact finding by the trial court was necessary to determine if a statutory exemption 
applied).  
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they do not possess them.195 
This interpretation of the PRA creates a substantial dilemma for 
agencies that must respond to requests for records they do not possess. 
For example, consider the following hypothetical: a city receives a 
public records request for “all communications (including associated 
metadata) relating to the zoning variance for building X.” In the course 
of searching for responsive records, the city discovers that an employee 
in the planning department sent email messages relating to that project’s 
approval from the employee’s private smartphone. The employee refuses 
to turn over the phone or provide the messages. As discussed in Part 
II.B, the agency does not have authority to inspect the employee’s 
private device, nor will it likely be able to seek a warrant compelling a 
search of the phone.196 In this circumstance, an agency would be forced 
to confront the same dilemma as the PUD in Concerned Ratepayers.197 
The messages and associated metadata would be disclosable under the 
PRA because they relate to the conduct of government and were 
“prepared” by an employee of the agency,198 but they would be 
practically impossible to disclose. Even if the city makes best efforts, 
under the current statutory scheme there is no mechanism that would 
allow the city to obtain the requested records.199 In this circumstance, it 
matters very little that the communications are technically “public 
records” because, practically, they are entombed within a private device 
protected by article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. 
Yet, the record is “disclosable” because it is both (1) a public record, and 
(2) not exempt from disclosure.200 Thus, presumably, despite the 
practical impossibility of disclosure, the agency could be liable for 
195. Id. at 954 n.6, 983 P.2d at 638 n.6. (noting in a footnote that the Concerned Ratepayer’s 
Association (CRA) had been put in touch with GE regarding the requested record but had “neither 
responded to the opportunity to meet with General Electric nor sought the District’s assistance in 
directly communicating with General Electric”). Thus, regardless of whether the technical 
specifications were exempted under the PRA, physical disclosure of the document apparently 
depended on GE’s consent. As such, if GE refused to provide the document, the PUD would be 
unable to disclose a document it had a duty to disclose and would presumably be liable for penalties 
and attorney fees under the PRA. Id. at 963–64, 983 P.2d at 643 (explaining that in order to prevail 
against an agency (and thus be entitled to attorney fees and penalties), a party must demonstrate that 
the requested document was disclosable); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550 (2014). 
196. See supra Part II.B. 
197. Concerned Ratepayers, 138 Wash. 2d at 954 n.6, 983 P.2d at 638 n.6 (suggesting that the 
PUD’s ability to obtain the requested documents depended on the consent of GE and Cogentrix). 
198. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (requiring agencies to make public records available 
for inspection and copying); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public” record). 
199. See supra notes 142–155 and accompanying text. 
200. See Concerned Ratepayers, 138 Wash. 2d at 963–64, 983 P.2d at 643. 
 
                                                     
18 - Paine_FinalAuthorReview (Complete) (Mar. 18 2015).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  12:10 PM 
572 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:545 
failing to produce the requested communications and metadata. 
Agencies should not be assessed statutory penalties for failing to 
disclose records they cannot obtain. Imposing statutory liability in this 
case does not promote open access to government records because the 
“agency,” as opposed to the individual in possession of the records, 
never had power to correct the situation. Rather, penalties in this case 
would merely burden taxpayers and detract from the agency’s ability to 
do its job. Further, an agency should not be punished for failing to 
violate an employee’s constitutional right to privacy. 
B. The Dilemma Will Persist Until the Legislature Acts 
A long-term solution to the dilemma is needed that both ensures 
public employees retain their constitutional privacy protections and 
preserves open access to government records. As the PRA’s proponents 
suggest, allowing public officers to systematically avoid disclosure by 
conducting public business on a private device would undermine the 
purpose of the Act.201 This Comment argues that the legislature should 
resolve the dilemma by amending the PRA to (1) ensure that emails 
concerning government business are always possessed by the associated 
agency, and (2) include an express administrative subpoena provision. 
First, ensuring that agencies have access to all electronic messages 
concerning public business could be accomplished by requiring public 
employees to carbon-copy (“CC”) an agency account when sending an 
email or other electronic message that concerns public business from a 
private account. Such a mechanism was proposed by the Federal 
Records Accountability Act of 2014, a bill that passed the U.S. House of 
Representatives in September 2014.202 The bill would require that 
federal employees or officers who send an electronic message related to 
official business from a non-work messaging account (1) include their 
official agency account as a recipient of the message and identify all 
recipients in the message, or (2) forward a complete copy of the 
message, including a complete list of recipients to an appropriate agency 
account within fifteen days.203 Failure by an employee to comply with 
201. Brian Sonntag & Rob McKenna, Guest: Public Officials Give up Some Privacy on Personal 
Cellphones, SEATTLE TIMES (Sep. 30, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/ 
2024665428_briansonntagrobmckennaopedpublicrecordsxxxml.html. 
202. See Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014, H.R. 5170, 113th Cong. (2014); Social 
Security Legislative Bulletin, House Passes H.R. 5170, the Federal Records Accountability Act of 
2014, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 24, 2014), available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/ 
legis_bulletin_092414c.html. 
203. Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014, H.R. 5170, 113th Cong. § 2911(a)(1)–(2) 
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the requirements could result in suspension or termination.204 The stated 
purpose of the bill is to improve federal employee compliance with 
federal and presidential recordkeeping requirements.205 In addition to the 
forwarding requirement, the Bill would put in a place a process for 
suspending or removing a federal employee who willfully and 
unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or 
falsifies a record in the employee’s custody.206 
Several jurisdictions have implemented laws with requirements that 
resemble those of the Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014. 
Missouri, for example, adopted a forwarding requirement into its 
sunshine law in 2004.207 Missouri’s statute requires a member of a 
governmental body “who transmits any message relating to public 
business by electronic means” to “concurrently transmit that message to 
either the member’s public office computer or the custodian of records 
in the same format.”208 However, this seemingly broad mandate applies 
only to messages sent to “two or more members” of that governmental 
body such that, when counting the sender “a majority of the body’s 
members are copied.”209 The District of Columbia Council also adopted 
a forwarding requirement into its Rules of Organization and 
Procedure.210 The Rule requires Council employees to use their 
government-provided email address to transact public business “unless 
the employee takes steps to ensure that any emails transmitted or 
received on an account other than the account provided by the 
(2014). Alternatively, the Bill also proposes that employees be allowed to print a covered message, 
including its recipients, and submit the printed copy for archival storage within fifteen days of the 
original’s transmission. Id. § 2911(a)(3). 
204. Id. § 2911(b). 
205. Id.  
206. Id. § 7522. 
207. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.025 (West 2006) (“Any member of a public governmental body 
who transmits any message relating to public business by electronic means shall also concurrently 
transmit that message to either the member’s public office computer or the custodian of records in 
the same format. The provisions of this section shall only apply to messages sent to two or more 
members of that body so that, when counting the sender, a majority of the body’s members are 
copied. Any such message received by the custodian or at the member’s office computer shall be a 
public record subject to the exceptions of section 610.021.”). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. See Rules of Organization and Procedure for the Council of the District of Columbia, 
COUNCIL OF THE D.C. § 811(g) (Feb. 25, 2013), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/ 
images/00001/20130315144923.pdf; Joey Senat, Whose Business Is It: Is Public Business 
Conducted on Officials’ Personal Electronic Devices Subject to State Open Records Laws?, 19 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 293, 324 (2014). 
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government are otherwise incorporated into the Council’s records.”211 In 
effect, both jurisdictions implemented forwarding requirements that 
allow covered agencies to possess and retain public records that were 
originally produced on a private device or account.212 
The Washington legislature might amend the PRA in a way similar to 
the Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014,213 thus ensuring that 
agencies possess public records that might otherwise only be contained 
in a private device or personal email account. Such an amendment could 
go a long way toward insulating agencies from the dilemma created by 
Concerned Ratepayers214 by ensuring that agencies possess the 
necessary records to provide a complete and responsive disclosure to a 
requestor. Amending the PRA to include a forwarding requirement 
would largely allow agencies to fulfill their statutory obligations215 while 
avoiding government intrusion into private devices. At least one 
commentator has proposed that states should consider adopting a similar 
forwarding requirement.216 
However, situations may still arise where certain records sought by 
requestors, such as telephone bill records or certain metadata, are not 
physically possessed by the agency.217 To address these situations the 
legislature should also include in the PRA a statutory provision that 
expressly authorizes the issuance of an administrative search warrant 
under certain specified conditions. While exploring the difficulties in 
designing such a provision, such as the need to protect associational 
privacy,218 is beyond the scope of this Comment, an administrative 
211. See Senat, supra note 210, at 324. 
212. Id. 
213. Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014, H.R. 5170, 113th Cong. (2014) 
214. Concerned Ratepayers Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark Cnty., Wash., 138 Wash. 2d 
950, 983 P.2d 635 (1999). 
215. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2014) (“Each agency, in accordance with published 
rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record 
falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (6) of this section, this chapter, or other statute 
which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records.”). 
216. See Senat, supra note 210, at 324 (suggesting that governments require employees to 
forward public-business-related emails and other records from their private accounts to work 
accounts within a specified period of time). 
217. An amendment to the PRA similar to the Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014 would 
not, for example, ensure that an agency possesses private employee call logs or certain metadata 
because neither is an “electronic message.” Metadata associated with an email is a public record in 
Washington. See O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 170 Wash. 2d 138, 148, 240 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2010) 
(holding that metadata embedded in an email was a public record under the PRA). 
218. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 114 Wash. 2d 
153, 158, 786 P.2d 781, 783 (1990) (adopting additional protections beyond the warrant 
requirement to protect associational materials protected by the First Amendment). 
 
                                                     
18 - Paine_FinalAuthorReview (Complete) (Mar. 18 2015).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2015  12:10 PM 
2015] PUBLIC RECORDS IN PRIVATE DEVICES 575 
warrant provision would presumably provide the necessary “authority of 
law” to render inspection of an employee’s private device 
constitutional.219 Thus, it could serve as an important gap filler to 
provide access to public records not possessed by an agency, including 
any that might be created in violation of an agency policy or the 
proposed PRA amendments. 
Regardless, until the legislature acts, agencies will likely continue to 
encounter situations where they cannot access records protected by 
article I, section 7. Internal agency policies might help address the 
problem, but there are serious questions about whether an agency could 
require employees to grant access to private devices as a condition of 
employment.220 In some situations, at least where the employee 
consents, an agency might use a private consultant to access public 
records stored on a private device. This technique was employed by the 
City of Goldbar as it attempted to respond to voluminous public records 
requests that had been directed toward its mayor and city council.221 
Because Goldbar’s part-time city council conducted much of the city’s 
business from private computers or through private email accounts,222 
the city itself was likely not in possession of many of the requested 
records. It appears that the public officials involved in that case 
consented to the consultant’s inspection of their email accounts.223 
However, employing such a tactic with non-consenting employees 
would be problematic and potentially unconstitutional.224 Thus, while 
internal agency policies and third-party inspectors may be helpful to 
agencies in mitigating the dilemma, they probably cannot remedy it. 
That task, it seems, must lie with the legislature. 
As agencies begin to address the implications of the PRA in the 
information age, courts should recognize the importance of the privacy 
219. See City of Pasco v. Shaw, 161 Wash. 2d 450, 459, 166 P.3d 1157, 1161–62 (2007). 
220. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 821–23, 10 P.3d 452, 466–67 (2000) 
(holding that applicants for public employment do not waive their privacy rights). 
221. See Forbes v. City of Goldbar, 171 Wash. App. 857, 859, 288 P.3d 384, 385 (2012). 
222. See id. at 864, 288 P.3d at 337 (“[C]ity officials used their private e-mail accounts to 
conduct city business.”). 
223. There is no mention in the court’s opinion that any of the city council members or then 
Mayor Hill opposed the use of the consultant. See generally id. However, the court notes that “[c]ity 
officials thought that Meyers was downloading just those files which concerned city business. 
However, Meyers downloaded their entire e-mail accounts for every city council member and then-
Mayor Hill.” Id. at 864, 288 P.3d at 387. 
224. No Washington case has yet addressed this particular issue but it is probably unlawful to 
require government employees to waive their privacy rights as a condition of employment. See 
Robinson, 102 Wash. App. at 821–22, 10 P.3d at 466–67 (holding that applicants for public 
employment do not waive their privacy rights). 
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interests at stake and avoid imposing statutory penalties where agencies 
fail to produce records they cannot constitutionally access or disclose. 
Under current law, agencies do not have the power to compel inspection 
of an employee’s private device225 and the PRA should not be 
interpreted to require such a search. Ultimately, the task of adapting the 
PRA to the intricacies of privacy in the information age and ensuring 
continued open access to government records lies with the legislature. 
The Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014226 provides a good 
example of the kind of sensible amendment that could significantly 
reduce the tension between article I, section 7 privacy rights and the 
PRA. 
CONCLUSION: GOING FORWARD 
As Washington’s courts grapple with applying the PRA in the 
information age, they should recognize the need to balance the PRA’s 
mandate for disclosure against Washington’s constitutional right to 
individual privacy. The PRA cannot serve as the foundation for the 
forced production of a private device because, as currently constituted, it 
cannot support the issuance of a warrant.227 Without the necessary 
“authority of law,” an agency is powerless to inspect an employee’s or 
elected official’s personal device for records. If the agency cannot 
inspect, it cannot disclose. In this situation, taxpayers should not be 
punished for the agency’s failure to produce records. Assessing 
penalties, ultimately to be borne by taxpayers, does not achieve the goals 
of the PRA and is a nonsensical response to the dilemma. 
Under current law, where a public employee or elected official 
properly invokes the privacy protection of article I, section 7 of the 
Washington State Constitution to resist disclosure of a private electronic 
device, the public records inquiry should be at an end. The PRA “must 
give way to constitutional mandates.”228 In this circumstance, a 
requestor must find recourse outside of Washington’s public record 
laws, relying on public opinion, the electoral process, or a lawsuit where 
discovery of relevant information will be sanctioned. As agencies begin 
to modernize their policies on private devices, the frequency with which 
this dilemma arises should be reduced. Ultimately, however, the 
dilemma will likely persist until the legislature acts to amend the PRA 
225. See supra Part II.B. 
226. Federal Records Accountability Act of 2014, H.R. 5170, 113th Cong. (2014). 
227. See supra notes 167–185 and accompanying text. 
228. Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 178 Wash. 2d 686, 695, 310 P.3d 1252, 1258 (2013). 
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and address the tension between article I, section 7 and the important 
public policy of open access to government records. 
 
 
